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Abstract
This article interrogates the political economy of Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port, ranked 
among the top ten container ports internationally by traffic, and its operating conglomerate, 
Dubai Ports World (DP World). The article aims to situate trade infrastructure in the 
production of Dubai’s economic geography as a sea–air multimodal trading hub. Three 
interrelated arguments are put forward: that port infrastructure plays an essential role 
in linking diverse moments of capital accumulation in Dubai; that Dubai’s state-owned 
conglomerates have overseen a substantial internationalization of Dubai’s capital through 
maritime port public–private partnership arrangements; and that the particularities of 
Dubai’s repressive labour regime underpin its role in the logistics industry internationally.
Introduction
Maritime transport continues to be the primary mode of trade in the global 
economy. According to the Review of Maritime Transport 2016 (UNCTAD, 2016), 
around 80 per cent of global trade by volume and over 70 per cent of global trade by 
value are carried by sea and are handled by ports worldwide’. Ports thus form a critical 
node in a global economy based on internationalized production and ever more complex 
supply chains. The analysis that follows focuses on Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port and its rapidly 
internationalizing operating company, Dubai Ports World (DP World) as one such 
critical node, understanding it as a broader element within a global logistics space of 
networked infrastructure, free trade zones, logistics hubs and trade corridors through 
which commodities circulate and transform before reaching consumers.
Through substantial investments in transport infrastructure and logistics 
capabilities, Dubai, one of the semi-autonomous city-states that make up the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), has become a major regional trade gateway and a re-export zone 
for commodities on the Europe/East Asia trade route. The prominent role of Dubai’s 
maritime port and airport operators is entrenched in a key segment of Dubai’s Strategic 
Plan 2021.1 Although vital to international supply chains, the inconspicuous constant 
movement of commodities through the city-state’s mega transport infrastructure remains 
largely invisible behind sizeable industrial complexes and is often overshadowed by the 
glamour of Dubai’s more spectacular mega real-estate development projects such as the 
Burj Khalifa (the world’s tallest building) or Palm Jumeirah.
This study interrogates the most prominent features of Dubai’s transport 
infrastructure. Three interrelated arguments are put forward. The first of these is 
that port infrastructure is a critical enabler of wider processes of capital formation in 
Dubai, linking apparently disjunctive moments of accumulation across the urban scale. 
Despite its relative absence in the literature on the political economy of the region, the 
port provides an essential infrastructural ‘glue’, tying together accumulation across 
1 The Dubai Strategic Plan 2015 or DSP 2015 was originally launched in 2007 by Sheikh Mohammad bin Rashid Al 
Maktoum. It was a public strategy document that put forward a ‘vision’ for the city-state’s development. Dubai Plan 
2021 (Government of Dubai, n.d.) followed, and its ‘The Economy’ section describes making Dubai ‘A Pivotal Hub 
in the Global Economy’ (see https://www.dubaiplan2021.ae/the-economy/).
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sectors such as real estate, trade, construction and retail. Secondly, this linking role is 
being increasingly internationalized, such that Dubai’s port-related conglomerates have 
substantially expanded their interests overseas through public–private partnerships 
(PPPs) and acquisitions. Thirdly, the particularities of Dubai’s repressive labour regime 
are a critical factor in these processes, underpinning the emergence of the city-state’s 
core position in the global maritime logistics industry. An understanding of the particular 
processes of labour management and disciplining mechanisms in Dubai thus helps us 
to recognize the highly uneven potential for labour contestation across supply chains. 
Through these three arguments, the article refocuses attention on Dubai’s port, providing 
a lens through which we may view capital accumulation across domestic and global scales.
Recent literature on Dubai has focused on its transition to a ‘global city’, its 
neoliberal model of urban development and its economic diversification plans (Davis, 
2006b; Davidson, 2008; Elsheshtawy, 2008; Kanna, 2011; Buckley and Hanieh, 2014). 
An important and rich historical literature has also traced the impact of British colonial 
policies on the emirate’s development trajectory and analysed relations between its 
merchant class and the ruling Al Maktoum family (ʻAbd Allāh, 1978; Zahlan, 1978; 
Heard-Bey, 1982; Peck, 1986; Naqīb, 1990; Al-Sayegh, 1998). These accounts help 
us understand Dubai’s history and the nuances of its political economy beyond the 
modern manufactured ‘brand’ of an emblematic success story of a liberalized economy 
with expansive high-rises and mega shopping malls (Bagaeen, 2007; Acuto, 2010). In 
particular, recent critical political economy literature illustrates patterns of capitalist 
class formation in Dubai, including the essential role of a state–capital nexus in promoting 
the internationalization of Emirati capital, thereby nurturing a range of large business 
conglomerates (both state and privately owned) that span different economic activities. 
This analytical emphasis on the relationship between the state, domestic capital groups 
and internationalization thus brings to the fore the power relations that underlie Dubai’s 
political economy beyond simplistic accounts of ruling family actions and ‘visions’.
Yet within the literature on Dubai, only a few studies have addressed the impact 
of port infrastructure and logistics on wider patterns of capital accumulation (Jacobs 
and Hall, 2007; Keshavarzian, 2010; Ramos, 2010; Akhavan, 2017). This article aims 
to contribute to this scant literature by tracing the impact of Dubai’s state-owned 
conglomerates and labour regime on the emergence of the city as a global trade hub. 
As a major, yet under-investigated, node in global circulation networks, the operations 
of Dubai’s transport conglomerates and mega infrastructure are particularly salient 
because they are projected as a model to aspire to, one whose key features are being 
replicated internationally. For example, the concept of a logistics city, a space dedicated 
entirely to logistics, was a Dubai innovation (Cowen, 2014). Indeed, in the wake of the 
2008 financial crisis, it was argued that ‘key elements of the Dubai model––especially 
the combination of First World infrastructure, an accommodating business climate, and 
low-cost labour––would likely survive the current crisis in Dubai and among its better 
capitalized neighbors’ (Herb, 2009: 379). As this study illustrates, not only did the model 
survive, but aspects of it, especially trade and logistics, came to be seen as ‘core functions’ 
that are less likely to be affected by financial crises than real estate (Bloch, 2010).
The two background sections that follow provide, first, a brief literature review 
of the changes in the global maritime trade industry and the particular role of maritime 
ports within this, and secondly, an account of the early development of trade and port 
infrastructure in Dubai. This background provides the basis for the core arguments of 
this article, which examine three aspects of Dubai’s contemporary trade infrastructure: 
patterns of ownership and capital accumulation around Dubai’s port infrastructure; the 
international expansion of DP World and the emirate’s prominence in global logistics 
networks; and the specific labour regime that underpins these processes. The research 
for this article was mainly conducted in Dubai between 2014 and 2016. It encompassed 
visits to Jebel Ali Free Zone (Jafza); Dubai Airport Cargo & Logistics City and Dubai 
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World Central, as well as visits to two labour camps and attendance of two regional 
cargo trade shows. It also included semi-structured interviews with regional managers 
at DP World and Jafza. The interviews supplement my analysis of Arabic and English 
construction, transport and logistics trade literature, as well as trade data from Dubai 
Customs, the Dubai Statistics Center and relevant reports published by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Ports: critical nodes in logistical systems
As Cowen (2010: 601) perceptively notes, ‘without the rapid and reliable 
movement of stuff through space––from factories in China to US big box stores, 
for instance––cheap labour in the global South cannot be “efficiently” exploited, 
and globalized production systems become as inefficient economically as they are 
environmentally’. Thus, business logistics is concerned with managing international 
supply chains from start of production, sourcing, processing, transport to final 
distribution, conceiving of constant circulation flows through an integrated logistics 
network. Very schematically, a maritime logistics chain would involve maritime shipping 
activities, logistics activities at the port, such as warehousing and packaging, and finally 
connectivity to other modes of transport. The bulk of global trade in manufactured 
commodities is carried on container ships, while bulk carriers transport raw materials 
such as iron ore and coal, and tankers transport crude oil, chemicals and petroleum 
products (Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port has terminals for all three types). Some authors argue 
that business logistics has essentially collapsed production and distribution into one 
integrated unit that is mapped onto an internationally networked logistics space of 
infrastructures, trade gateways, corridors and logistics clusters (Bonacich and Wilson, 
2008; Martin, 2012; Cowen, 2014). Maritime ports are thus critical nodes within this 
integrated logistics space––one shaped by technological shifts in maritime trade, 
complex supply chains and a global division of labour.
Significant technological innovations in the 1960s and 1970s were decisive 
in the development of maritime logistics, as well as the overall social and spatial 
formation of seaborne trade and maritime ports. As Sekula and Burch (2011, n.p.n.) 
aptly put it, ‘without a “revolution” in ocean-going cargo-handling technology, the 
global factory would not exist, nor the phenomenon of globalization itself ’. For example, 
the development of information technology assisted with tracking commodities in 
circulation, communication across firms and shaping the complex logistics systems 
modelling software necessary for managing production and distribution on an 
international scale. Containerization, in turn, was crucial for the standardization of 
circulation through multiple modes of transport (from port to rail, ship, truck, air––i.e. 
intermodalism), reducing the time and labour involved in transporting commodities 
(Levinson, 2008; Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2009).
Containerization increased the automation of ports as a result of mechanized 
handling of standard-size boxes and had a significant impact on ship size and port design. 
From 1980 to 2015 seaborne container trade increased by 1,500%, with container ship 
size doubling and mega ports emerging to accommodate the change.2 Mega ports offered 
automated terminal facilities and inland services, including warehousing, logistics 
cities access, inland distributions routes and connections to airports that facilitate 
circulation. Ports became integrated into in a new environment of complete supply chain 
management, logistical networks, international sourcing of products and intermodalism. 
This changed the very spatial relationship between ports and urban centres. In contrast 
to historical ports, which are integrated with the surrounding communities, new mega 
ports were conceived as gated industrial complexes isolated from city centres, allowing 
for logistical capacities and connection to other modes of transport.
2 Figure calculated by author based on the UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2016
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Along with such shifts, overarching neoliberal economic trends have shaped 
the maritime industry, including increasing privatization of port assets through 
PPPs to secure funding for mega port construction (Roumboutsos, 2015), increasing 
financialization of maritime trade (Rodrigue et al., 2011), and critically, emerging 
concentrations across the industry. For example, there was a definitive shift towards 
privately owned global terminal operators, with a handful of corporations controlling 
significant international portfolios––these include DP World (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 
2012). As the rest of this article illustrates, Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port and DP World exemplify 
these overarching trends in the maritime trade industry.
Dubai’s port infrastructure––the early beginnings
Dubai has grown considerably over the past 50 years to become a global 
transhipment hub. From its historical position as a fishing and pearling settlement 
around a creek, maritime trade has been central to Dubai’s character and the emergence 
of a merchant class historically connected to the Indian Ocean economy. Dubai is 
situated about 230 km southwest of the Strait of Hormuz and has a population of almost 
two and a half million (the majority being non-citizens). Much like the rest of the Gulf 
region, Dubai’s political structures are based on the hereditary rule of one family, the 
Al Maktoum family, part of the Bani Yas tribe. This structure was cemented through 
the ‘trucial system’ of 1835, whereby the British centralized power with allied sheikhs 
(Heard-Bey, 1982; Peck, 1986). The current ruler, Sheikh Mohammad, governs through 
an appointed consultative executive council made up of close allies representing 
traditionally influential merchant families.
Dubai became particularly important to British colonialism from the early 
1900s after the cancellation of British leasing and tax rights in the port of Lingah 
(Davidson, 2008). Seizing the opportunity, then ruler Maktoum bin Hashar attracted 
merchants from Lingah by offering cheap land and minimal taxation (Heard-Bey, 1982). 
Dubai became the port of call for the British India Steam Navigation Company. This, 
in turn, affected the makeup of Dubai’s merchant class, attracting more Persian and 
Indian traders, who were incorporated into Dubai’s society (Al-Sayegh, 1998). Oil was 
discovered in Dubai in 1966, but amounts were always meagre compared to those of 
neighbouring Abu Dhabi. By the time Dubai reached independence in 1971, a ‘clear 
developmental blueprint’ had been established based on oil production, emphasizing 
trade infrastructure and reliance on imported labour from the Asian subcontinent to 
maintain construction activity (Ramos, 2010: 51–74). This blueprint continued intact 
under US hegemony in the region.
Because of its small oil reserves, Dubai’s ruling family and merchant class were 
eager to expand the city’s position as a trading hub. Its seaports and airport were 
cornerstones of its development trajectory. Dubai’s three ports were built around the 
time the city-state became independent: Port Rashid in 1967, Port Hamriya in 1975 
and, lastly, Jebel Ali in 1979 (Ramos, 2010; Akhavan, 2017). The Land Law of 1960 was 
critical to the geographical expansion of the ports. With the exception of lands for 
which nationals demonstrated occupancy for a set time, this law gave ownership of 
all land to the ruling family. Essentially, it was this massive act of land enclosure that 
enabled infrastructural developments. Within Jebel Ali Port specifically, ‘control of all 
the port land ultimately lies in the hands of the Emir or ruler of Dubai who has gifted 
the freehold to Dubai Port Authority’ (Jacobs and Hall, 2007: 333). Although a detailed 
analysis of the relationship between Dubai’s transport infrastructure and militarism is 
outside the scope of this article, it is worth noting that Dubai’s infrastructure has been 
intricately connected to its geopolitical positioning. As many authors have explained, 
control over the region’s resources and trade routes has been central to US-dominated 
capitalism (Vitalis, 2007; Jones, 2010) and securing important shipping lanes along the 
Strait of Hormuz is central to US policy in the region. It is no coincidence that the Jebel 
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Ali Port harbour is the US Navy’s most-visited port, because it can accommodate the 
largest aircraft carriers and battleships (Keshavarzian, 2010: 276).
With the ascent of neoliberal economics from the 1980s onwards, including 
internationalized production and reduction of trade barriers, Dubai transmuted into 
the regional prototype for the most advanced liberalization and financialization policies 
(Davis, 2006a; Kanna, 2011). Dubai’s ruling family consolidated its power by redirecting 
oil revenues to their allies within the merchant classes, giving rights to land or jobs in 
the public sector, which eventually led to the development of domestic conglomerates 
formed around specific economic sectors (Hanieh, 2015). Efforts to diversify the economy 
from oil focused on building up the transport and logistics sector, finance and tourism, 
and creating free trade zone clusters such as Media City (to attract regional media 
companies to set up headquarters in Dubai). In the contemporary period, a set of state 
holding companies, often referred to as ‘Dubai Inc.’, manage various aspects of Dubai’s 
political economy. They are typically controlled directly by members of the ruling family 
and associated with private conglomerates led by merchants historically closely allied 
to the ruling family. However, as Hanieh has emphasized, ‘Gulf ruling families––while 
clearly dominating state power––should be viewed as the central, organizing core of the 
Gulf capitalist class itself, rather than as simply the locus of political power’ (Hanieh, 
2015: 6). The next section explores the relationship between this state–capital nexus, 
capital accumulation and logistical infrastructures in more depth.
Capital accumulation and Dubai’s contemporary trade infrastructure
Dubai has undergone rapid transformation in terms of its urban landscape over 
the past two decades, leading to sustained academic interest in the scale and form of 
its urbanization process, with some labelling it an exceptional model (see Hvidt, 2009; 
Elsheshtawy, 2010). Others have moved beyond the exceptionalism narrative, situating 
Dubai within international neoliberal trends and critically tracing the connection 
between liberalization, urbanization and the emergence of domestic capital groups 
imbricated in the transition of the built environment (Kanna, 2011; 2013; Buckley and 
Hanieh, 2014; Hanieh, 2015). In his discussion of Jebel Ali Port specifically, Ramos 
(2010) has insightfully emphasized the importance of examining the link between trade 
infrastructure and urbanization. I build on such critical accounts to analyse the impact 
of logistical infrastructure on urbanization patterns, capital accumulation and class 
formation in Dubai.
While the port features in academic accounts of Dubai’s development, it is often 
treated as a stagnant backdrop, and not as an essential enabler of capital accumulation 
among Dubai’s domestic capital groups. Capital groups such as Futtaim, Rostamani, 
Habtoor, Belhasa, Lootah, Al Ghurair and Ghobash, which dominate Dubai’s political 
economy, work in tandem with state-owned holding corporations; these groups are 
known for their accumulation activities across key sectors, including construction, 
retail, finance and logistics, all of which are dependent on transport infrastructures. Far 
from being a backdrop, Dubai’s logistical infrastructures bind spaces of transnational 
and national exchange, essentially functioning as the ‘glue’ that combines various 
accumulation activities under the overall framework of Dubai Inc.
The government-owned holding corporations that form Dubai Inc., which, 
among other things, own and manage the city-state’s circulatory infrastructure, include:
• Dubai World, which holds the portfolio for DP World, Drydocks World, Dubai 
Maritime City, Economic Zones World and Istithmar World;
• Investment Corporation of Dubai (ICD), with holdings in most economic sectors, 
within transport specifically, is invested in the Emirates airline, dnata (one of the 
world’s largest air service providers), Dubai Aerospace Enterprise (DAE) and budget 
airline flydubai;
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• Dubai Airports Company, which was formed in April 2007 by splitting the 
Department of Civil Aviation into the Dubai Civil Aviation Authority and Dubai 
Airports Company; the latter owns, operates and manages airports in Dubai and 
through its subsidiaries provides warehousing services and a cargo and logistics 
free trade zone.
Table 1 outlines the link between these profit-driven holding companies, the corporatized 
infrastructures and the operating conglomerates they own.
Specifically, Jebel Ali Port, DP World’s flagship port, is the world’s largest 
engineered harbour and largest container port between Rotterdam and Singapore. 
It continues to expand, with plans currently in place to increase its capacity to 22.1 
million TEUs by 2018.3 This port cements Dubai’s position as the main trade gateway 
and re-export zone in the wider region. An indication of its growth is the substantial 
increase in container traffic through Dubai from 7.62 million TEUs in 2005 to 15.6 
million TEUs in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2015). Major container shipping lines call in at the 
port, including feeder vessels to ports on the African and Indian subcontinents, making 
it a crucial logistical space for broader accumulation trends in neighbouring regions too.
The port is surrounded by the Jebel Ali Free Zone (Jafza), which houses more 
than 7,000 companies engaged in the manufacturing, trade, logistics, industrial and 
service-orientated sectors. Both Jebel Ali and Jafza are linked to the Dubai World Central 
complex, a planned mega residential, commercial and logistics zone that also encompasses 
Al Maktoum International Airport.4 In line with concepts of integrated logistics space, the 
various infrastructural elements are part of one customs-free zone with an airport–seaport 
corridor, allowing cargo to be moved from port to airport within 20 minutes. Dubai 
Logistics City, which was opened in 2007, is located within Dubai World Central. It is a 
200-square-kilometre area that offers companies access to a substantial part of the Jebel 
Ali Free Zone and logistics facilities. Cowen (2014: 172) explains how Dubai Logistics 
City ‘sets momentous precedents for the production of urban space and the politics of 
infrastructure protection, reaching far beyond Dubai and the Gulf region’. The various 
spaces are also connected through an online portal, Dubai Trade, allowing businesses 
to submit import/export regulatory documents to multiple state agencies online. Thus, 
Dubai’s logistical infrastructure is interlocked with broader technological networks 
designed to automate and systematize state functions in relation to trade.
In Jafza and Dubai Logistics City, commodities are assembled, labelled and/
or repackaged mainly for re-export. Indeed, 74% of total free zone trade imports are 
re-exported.5 Major international brands have chosen Jebel Ali Free Zone as their 
regional headquarters to make it the principal regional gateway for their commodities. 
Dubai’s direct foreign non-oil trade mainly centres on precious stones, electronics, 
vehicles and construction materials.
Jafza attracts more than 20% of the UAE’s foreign direct investment and exceeds 
50% of Dubai’s total exports. As part of the ‘soft infrastructure’ to attract firms, Jafza 
incentives include:
a 100% foreign ownership, 0% corporate tax for 50 years (a concession that is 
renewable), no restriction on capital repatriation, 0% import or re-export duties, 
0% personal income tax, no currency restrictions, no restriction on foreign talent 
or employees ability to mortgage your premises to a bank or financing company 
and onsite customs (Jafza, n.d.).
3 TEU stands for ‘twenty-foot equivalent unit’ and is used to describe the capacity of container ships and container 
terminals.
4 In the aviation sector, Dubai’s two airports, Dubai International and Al Maktoum International, are hubs for cargo 
transit. Dubai International is ranked 6th in terms of cargo transport internationally. Al Maktoum International 
Airport is the hub for Emirates SkyCargo, the cargo airline division of Dubai’s Emirates airline.
5 Figure calculated by author based on Dubai customs data for 2015.
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Jafza officials are keen to emphasize the ‘efficiency’ of setting up in the free zone, 
as opposed to the ‘red tape in other Arab states’. As we walked through Jafza’s ‘one 
stop shop’, a Jafza media officer remarked that ‘our customers just need to deal with 
one person and fill in one form to do business here––this is unimaginable anywhere 
else’.6 Keshavrzian has argued that Dubai’s free zones, far from being a limitation on 
sovereignty, form important ‘nodes to circulate rent to domestic and international 
members of ruling coalitions’ (Keshavarzian, 2010: 263). Jafza and Jebel Ali Port, as one 
such important node, are essential to capital accumulation and circulation for Dubai’s 
state-owned conglomerates and domestic capital groups.
Logistical infrastructure plays a critical role in speeding up circulation and 
binding circulatory space, shaping forms of capital accumulation. Dubai’s domestic 
capital groups, typically operating across several business sectors, rely on trade 
infrastructure for imports/exports which, in turn, transform the urban environment. 
For example, Ghurair group, one of the largest private conglomerates, founded in Dubai 
in 1960, owns a packaging plant that produces cardboard products for storage and 
shipping purposes, as well as a freight and shipping company, and is the largest trader of 
dry bulk cargo. Ghurair also operates a construction company and an aluminium factory, 
owns a controlling stake in the National Cement Company and Emaar Properties, and 
significantly holds agency rights for an array of commodities, including Daewoo, Edimax 
and Samsung. Capital accumulation within this diverse portfolio is contingent upon 
logistical infrastructure enabling the import/export of consumer commodities and 
construction materials, along with the logistical functions from which the group profits.
In the retail sector, imports are organized around ownership of agency rights to 
specific commodities, typically granted to allies of the ruling family in domestic capital 
groups. Dubai’s branding as a shopping destination, symbolized by a number of mega 
shopping malls, is thus directly tied to the emirate’s ability to import large volumes 
of commodities through such agency rights. The production of the city as a regional 
shopping centre and the form of mega shopping malls is tied to patterns of development, 
which include reliance on the import of consumer goods and the necessary infrastructure 
to speed up circulation. For example, Futtaim Group owns the agency rights to IKEA, 
Marks & Spencer, Toyota and Lexus. Habtoor Group owns the agency rights to Bentley, 
Mack Trucks and Mitsubishi. It is important to note that such agency rights largely mirror 
the list of top commodities imported into Dubai, including automobiles, electrical items, 
machinery and household goods. While a significant proportion of goods is re-exported, 
Dubai’s economy, which is concentrated mainly in the service sector, continues to be 
highly dependent on commodity imports to sustain its growth.
Another principal site of capital accumulation in Dubai is related to construction 
activities. Capital concentrated in this sector has historically benefited from substantial 
state contracts and subcontracts for mega infrastructure and industrial developments. 
Such contracts were significant for the emergence of domestic capital groups, which 
went on to dominate the transformation of Dubai’s built environment through real-
estate developments (Hanieh, 2015). After the slump that followed the 2008 financial 
crisis, Dubai’s construction sector is now advancing again in the run-up to Expo 2020, 
which has been awarded to Dubai. Infrastructure expansion has been vital for the 
contracts it generates and, significantly, spaces such as Jebel Ali Port allow for the 
export of construction materials produced in Dubai (such as cement and aluminium) 
and the import of necessary products to sustain the rapid level of construction. Jebel Ali 
Port and its surrounding logistical spaces are thus imbricated in the production of the 
city as a collection of mega real-estate projects.
Finally, the logistics industry itself is a major area of capital accumulation, 
accounting for 14% of Dubai’s gross domestic product. The connection between maritime 
6 Interview with Jafza media officer, Dubai, February 2016.
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and aviation ports, land transport and logistics areas, coupled with soft infrastructural 
incentives, make Dubai highly attractive for international and local logistics companies. 
It is no coincidence that the two largest regionally based logistics firms, Aramex and 
Agility, operate out of Dubai. Agility’s largest Middle East distribution centre is located 
in Jafza. Dubai’s geographic location is routinely marketed to major players in the 
logistics industry, with top companies locating their regional headquarters in Jebel Ali. 
Dubai is thus fundamentally specialized in commodity circulation through its networked 
logistical infrastructures. The focus on logistical capacities not only inserts Dubai into 
global networks––it also influences forms of local urban development, conceiving of 
spaces like Dubai World Central as nodes in interconnected logistics space marked by 
their ability to enhance circulation.
Emerging from these seemingly disjunctive moments of accumulation, whether 
in retail, construction or logistics, is the central role of infrastructure in knitting together 
accumulation across the entire circuit of capital. The symbiotic relationship between 
state-owned holding companies, corporatized infrastructure and domestic capital 
groups underpins processes of capital accumulation and transformations in the urban 
environment.
DP World’s internationalization
DP World, Jebel Ali’s operating company, is one of the leading port operators 
that dominates the market internationally, with global assets in a network of more than 
77 marine and inland terminals across six continents. In 2015, DP World handled 61.7 
million TEUs, ranking fourth internationally among maritime terminals by throughput 
(DP World, n.d.). This is in line with overarching trends in the maritime industry 
towards the centralization of port operations through a handful of private operators 
(Slack and Frémont, 2005; Olivier and Slack, 2006; Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2012) and 
the privatization of port assets internationally through PPP agreements.
DP World is the result of multiple transitions in the management of Dubai’s 
ports. Initially, Jebel Ali was managed by US company Sealand Shipping and was not as 
successful as Dubai’s first port, Rashid Port, managed by Grey Mackenzie (Ramos, 2010). 
Port Rashid, which until then was Dubai’s main port, was in direct competition with 
Jebel Ali. It was not until the 1990s that the state ended both management contracts 
and formed a single state-owned but commercially independent company: Dubai 
Ports Authority (DPA). The DPA had an international investment arm, Dubai Ports 
International (DPI), which focused on acquiring foreign port terminals. As Dubai 
continued to grow, the location of Port Rashid in the city centre became untenable, and 
a decision was taken to close the port. This could only be done once major extensions to 
Jebel Ali Port had taken place in the early 2000s, allowing for transfer of capacity and for 
the closure of Port Rashid. During an interview, a Jafza marketing manager adamantly 
stated that it was the free zone that was responsible for the success of Jebel Ali Port, 
explaining that ‘initially liners did not switch from Port Rashid, until the prospect of 
the free trade zone attracted them’. In 2005, both DPA and DPI were merged to create 
DP World, managed under the auspices of government-owned holding company Dubai 
World, with a portfolio also containing Drydocks World, Economic Zones World and 
Istithmar World. Dubai World’s chairman until 2010 was Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, 
one of the ruling family’s closest allies. In the wake of the financial crisis, in December 
2010, he was removed from his post and demoted to chairman of DP World, while the 
position of head of Dubai World was filled by Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum.
DP World was a critical springboard for the regional and international 
expansion of Dubai’s logistics networks through a series of acquisitions and concession 
contracts. It emerged as a local port operator, and in the 2000s began a programme of 
regional expansion with concessions in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), Doraleh (Djibouti) and 
Visakhapatnam (India), among others. By 2005, DP World was on a clear path towards 
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internationalizing its port assets through the purchase of CSX World Terminals, a leading 
global container terminal operator, and the purchase of the Peninsular and Oriental 
Steam Navigation Company (P&O) the following year. These massive acquisitions 
established DP World as a global player with terminal operations in Australia, Asia, 
Europe and the Americas. In a significant acquisition, DP World extended its operating 
license for DP World Southampton until 2047: following a deal with Associated British 
Ports (ABP) it acquired ABP’s 49% stake in DP World Southampton, making DP World 
the sole owner.
The rationale of export-led development put an emphasis on trade infrastructure 
and logistics functions as key mechanisms for successful involvement in global trade, 
the World Bank even producing a logistics index for every state. Developing states were 
increasingly encouraged to privatize infrastructure as a measure to secure funding for 
port expansion and integration into larger port networks. PPPs in the transport sector 
were pushed by international development organizations such as the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. This led to an expansion of the role of private port operators in 
constructing, financing and managing port operations (Siemiatycki, 2013). DP World 
took advantage of this privatization process, expanding its network internationally. 
Table 2 outlines DP World’s concessionary agreements by type from 2000 to 2009, 
providing an overview of the scope of the conglomerate’s aggressive internationalization 
strategy.7 More recently, the Dubai government has attempted to codify standards 
for PPPs within Dubai itself, passing Law No. 22 of 2015, indicating that future local 
infrastructure projects will involve higher levels of privatization.
Although DP World’s own corporate history explains the development trajectory 
in Jebel Ali Port as a linear rise to port efficiency through vision and technological 
innovation, the model of mega infrastructure expansion based on debt financing 
came into question during the financial crisis in 2008. DP World was entangled with 
debts from parent company Dubai World, and its credit rating was downgraded. On 
26 November 2009, Dubai World requested a delay on the repayment of its US $26 
billion debt, and a few days later Dubai’s finance department noted that the debts were 
not guaranteed by the state. What had seemed a given principle of Dubai’s liberalized 
economy, that investments in state-owned conglomerates were backed by the state, was 
now uncertain.
Dubai World used aid from Abu Dhabi to mediate the crisis, and to repay urgent 
debts until it could renegotiate payment terms with its creditors. Negotiations with 
creditors led to Dubai World offering to repay debts, although with delays of up to eight 
years. Dubai World appointed a chief restructuring officer (CRO), British accountant 
Aidan Birkett, from Deloittes, who secured the agreement of a majority of creditors to 
a rescheduled repayment plan of Dubai World’s liabilities (Hughes, 2010). While the 
conglomerate’s major liabilities were contained within its Nakheel subsidiary, a real-
estate developer, the impact of the crisis on Dubai’s image more generally was significant. 
DP World, which has a gross debt of US $8.2 billion, mainly in bonds, continues to repay 
its debts. In attempting to shift its debt burden, Dubai World sold off Economic Free 
Zones, which owns Jafza, to its subsidiary DP World in a US $2.6 billion deal.
7 Of course, DP World’s expansion was not always openly welcomed, as indicated by the controversy over their 
operation of several US ports that had been operated by P&O before being purchased by DP World. After much 
media attention questioning the security of US ports under DP World administration, the deal was blocked at US 
congressional level, although US president Bush at the time threatened to use his veto to ensure the deal would go 
through (Mostaghel, 2007). In the end, DP World sold its P&O American operations to the American International 
Group’s asset management division. In Djibouti, DP World’s operating concession at the Doraleh Container 
Terminal was also annulled and arbitration proceedings began following an investigation that indicated that the 
deal signed with DP World unfairly favoured the company (Styan, 2013; Kerr, 2014). Moreover, in Yemen, DP 
World sold its 50% stake in a container terminal in Aden in September 2012 four years into a 30-year management 
contract following allegations that it had failed to complete the investment projects agreed upon (Barnard, 2014).
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Both the expansion of DP World and the entrenched role of finance capital in 
its operations highlight the deepening internationalization of Dubai’s capital, but also 
its susceptibility to financing crises and its dependence on steady rates in global trade. 
Officials from DP World and Jafza were eager to affirm that the trade and logistics sector 
is shielded from financial crises and continues to make profits, noting that ‘since the 
crisis, our government has taken steps to learn from past mistakes and introduce new 
regulations to safeguard Dubai’s economy’.8 However, projections on global trade are 
ultimately likely to determine the future trajectories of the sector.
Labour regimes and port geography
The nascent critical literature on logistics chains has paid particular attention 
to the central role labour is able to play in disrupting global trade, and thus capital 
accumulation at specific strategic transport nodes (Bonacich and Wilson, 2008; Neilson, 
2012; Cowen, 2014; Toscano, 2014). The contradiction of the modern ‘lean’ system of 
production, integrated transnational supply and logistics networks, lies precisely in the 
extreme effect any disruptions may have. Neilson (2012: 330) explains that ‘logistics 
workers have realized they hold a strategic position in global production systems’. 
However, much of this analysis has thus far focused on labour contestation in the 
major unionized ports of the global North and went on to generalize from there. While 
labour certainly has the capacity to disrupt commodity flows through strike action, for 
example, it is necessary to critically examine how regionally specific labour regimes 
shape contestation. If indeed, as Mezzadra and Neilson (2015) have argued, ‘operations 
of capital’ can be understood through three conduits of analysis––‘extraction, finance, 
and logistics’––our analysis of labour power at critical transport nodes must be grounded 
within specific geographies, political structures and labour regimes. This is especially 
necessary in Dubai’s case because of its significance as trade and transhipment hub, and 
the specificity of its labour regime.
While Dubai is credited with ‘excellent sea ports and airports, an efficient 
telecommunication network and wide ranging IT capabilities, as well as a skilled and 
disciplined workforce’ (Fernandes and Rodrigues, 2011: 78), what is scarcely mentioned 
in corporate accounts is the highly repressive labour regime that produced such a 
‘disciplined workforce’. A strict ethnoracial hierarchy governs the workforce in Dubai, 
affording nationals welfare entitlements and job security in the public sector that 
is denied to the non-citizen population made up of a North American and Western 
European managerial class, a middle stratum of Arab and Asian professionals and a 
majority of low-wage labourers from South Asia. In 2015, non-citizens made up 85.5% of 
Dubai’s total employed population. While 55% of employed Emiratis were concentrated 
in the public and defence sectors, non-citizen labour is clustered around construction, 
with 29.3% of non-citizen males engaged in this sector, according to the Bulletin of 
Labor Force Survey Results (DSC, 2016). Differences between Emiratis and expatriates 
were evident throughout the results. The low overall unemployment rate of 0.8%, for 
example, contrasted with an 8.7% unemployment figure for Emiratis, who made up only 
3% of Dubai’s workforce. The banning of trade unions, the banning of public protests, 
the linking of legal residency status to employers through the kafala system, and tight 
monitoring of the population through a population registry constitute a strict matrix of 
control that severely curtails labour contestation.
A rich literature has attended to specific forms of labour exploitation in the 
Arabian Peninsula (Khalaf and Alkobaisi, 1999; Kapiszewski, 2001; Al-Awad and 
Elhiraika, 2003; Vitalis, 2007; Khalaf et al., 2015). More recent analyses have been 
further nuanced through a focus on the gendered and racialized hierarchies that have 
emerged, as well as on workers’ self-organized actions in opposition to this status quo 
8 Interview with a DP World corporate media relations officer, Dubai, February 2016.
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(Chalcraft, 2011; Buckley, 2012). Longva’s (2005) account of ‘civic ethnocracy’, originally 
used in relation to Kuwait, has been dominant within the literature describing the 
ethno-national character of Arabian Peninsula states, where the ruling families and 
allied merchants maintain control over a majority non-citizen population. It is worth 
noting that, despite this relationship vis-à-vis migrant labour, nationals often express 
anxiety at being a minority within the state. Ruling families, in turn, project themselves 
as safeguarding the local culture while remaining committed to modernization through 
liberalization in business. The labour regime thus not only ossifies class relations within 
an ethnoracial hierarchy, it also works to consolidate the power of the ruling family.
Although some authors have argued that exclusionary practices similar to the 
kafala system exist elsewhere and do not make the region exceptional (Vora and Koch, 
2015), it is rather the specific ratio of citizen to non-citizen labour that is exceptional, 
with non-citizens making up the majority of the population but lacking basic rights and 
having no avenues for naturalization (especially in the lower strata of the workforce). 
The mass deportation of migrant labour during Dubai’s financial crisis targeted mainly 
low-wage workers, but also categorically exposed the matrix of control governing labour 
relations, where some migrant families may indeed reside in Dubai for generations, yet 
have no right to naturalize and no protection from expulsion. This, of course, does not 
foreclose the potential for labour action; Arabtec, a major construction conglomerate, 
for example, faced coordinated strikes across several worksites in 2013. However, 
deportations of striking workers quickly followed (Peel and Kerr, 2013).
This restrictive labour regime was a key factor that helped propel Dubai into 
global prominence in transnational logistics networks. The operation of Dubai’s 
infrastructure is dependent on this extremely strict ethnoracial segmentation of a 
management class mainly drawn from Western corporate ranks and a highly exploitable 
cheap labour force drawn largely from South Asia for construction and manual labour 
within ports and free trade zones. At the cargo show for the Middle East and North 
Africa (Cargo Show MENA), a recruitment agent from a British firm explained, ‘we are 
looking to recruit the top managers from Europe and the US to work in Dubai’s transport 
sector, here they can have competitive salaries, and a Disneyland lifestyle’.9 In contrast 
to this ‘Disneyland lifestyle’, a short distance from Dubai’s main metro stops, which are 
all named after the mega shopping malls or banks that line the central highway, there 
are the over-crowded labour camps that stretch into the dessert, which most visitors 
will never encounter. It is these masses of invisibilized workers that account for the fast 
pace construction of infrastructure.
Within newly constructed logistics cities and free trade zones, workers are 
housed in what are called ‘labour villages’ within the complexes. While these cut the 
arduous journeys from labour camps outside the city, they remain a form of labour 
control and discipline, by containing labour within the workspace. Entry to the port and 
free zone area itself is restricted through biometric gates and barriers that encircle the 
area, with guards stationed at all entrances. This overall security apparatus regulates 
and disciplines labour on the port. Global transport union federations, such as the 
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), which developed noticeably in 
the broader Middle East and North Africa region in the post-uprisings period of 2011 
(Anderson, 2013) does not operate in Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port owing to restrictions on 
trade unions.
In significant ways, the port geography itself is also a hindrance to labour 
contestation. Much like other newly developed mega ports, Jebel Ali Port is an 
isolated and securitized industrial complex. While in the past ports were built around 
communities, and dock workers were able to see their families and each other to 
9 Interview with a recruitment agent at Cargo Show MENA, Dubai, April 2015.
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organize, building what Sears (2014) has termed an ‘infrastructure of dissent’ that could 
sustain labour actions, these new highly automated mega ports are by design isolated 
and isolating. The trend towards automation is very significant and has become one of 
the cornerstones of DP World’s expansion internationally: the ability to implement new 
technologies reduces the number of workers needed. At the various logistics trade shows 
in Dubai it is rare to see even a single image of a human being operating machinery; the 
main emphasis is on technological innovation and automation. Although human labour 
continues to be essential to the operations of ports, its standardized exploitation in 
locations such as Dubai is not an auxiliary to ‘success’ in business logistics; indeed, it 
is precisely what makes Dubai attractive to firms wanting to avoid labour disruptions 
along supply chains. The Dubai model is attractive internationally precisely because of 
the coupling of high levels of automation and restrictive labour conditions.
Conclusion
This article has sought to take note of ‘the centrality of infrastructure in the 
construction of the city as “modern”, as a site of capitalist production and expansion, 
as constitutive of social relations of inequality, and as a space of environmental 
transformation’ (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008: 363). By drawing on the emerging 
literature on logistics space and integrating more recent critical political economy 
accounts of Dubai, I trace the specificities of Dubai’s maritime port infrastructure and 
operating conglomerate, accounting for the city-state’s prominence in global logistics 
chains. The focus on Jebel Ali Port, its free zone and DP World reveals important detail 
about transnational logistics chains and the integration of repressive labour regimes 
within them.
There is without doubt a need for further research in this area, which takes 
seriously the impact of logistical infrastructures on the economic geography of Arabian 
Peninsula cities. Important considerations are the UAE’s highly devolved policy-making 
processes, which have led to competition with other emirates, who are diversifying 
their economies through trade infrastructure, building and expanding ports, airports 
and free zones. A similar process is taking place across the region through emerging 
mega ports in several states, most notably Oman’s Salalah Port, situated outside the 
Strait of Hormuz, which potentially offers a significant reduction in journey time for 
maritime transport. While officials at DP World were quick to dismiss such emerging 
competition, the question of port over-capacity is a serious one to consider at a regional 
scale. When asked if there were contingencies to deal with competition from other ports 
in neighbouring states, a Jafza official explained:
Yes we have a team that watches out for such matters, but there is no other 
place in our region that can compete with Jebel Ali. We have been doing this 
for a long time, we have the most modern equipment, and Dubai has the most 
accommodating environment and lifestyle prospects to attract the necessary 
expertise to live in Dubai long term.10
This narrative is part and parcel of Dubai’s larger branding as the main expatriate 
destination in the region, which is said to afford its managerial class a lifestyle that 
is less restrictive than other Gulf states. Yet, as this article has shown, behind such 
narratives lies a far more complex story of globalization, capital accumulation and 
labour repression. Dubai’s port infrastructure––with Dubai conceived as the core of 
a multimodal transport hub that encompasses free trade zones, logistics cities and 
other infrastructure––has underpinned class formation in the emirate itself, linking 
10 Interview with a recruitment agent at Cargo Show MENA, Dubai, April 2015.
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various moments of accumulation across urban space. This process has been overseen 
by a particular configuration of state–capital relations, with large conglomerates as the 
primary owners (and beneficiaries) of these infrastructure networks. Simultaneously, 
Dubai’s port infrastructure is rapidly extending throughout the wider global economy, 
constituting a key node in the circulatory movement of capital within international 
trade routes. Underlying both of these processes is a distinctive labour regime––based 
on repression and exclusion––which has conferred a particular advantage to Dubai’s 
infrastructure growth. An understanding of these interconnected features of the 
logistics space is essential for explaining how and why infrastructure is at the core of 
Dubai’s particular brand of capitalism, while also pointing out potentialities for future 
disruption.
Rafeef Ziadah, SOAS University of London, Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, 
London WC1H 0XG, UK, RZ2@soas.ac.uk
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